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This paper presents an alternative or enhanced approach to information
acquisition in Cournot markets with stochastic demand in which the cost of
information acquisition in endogenously determined by …rms’ information pur-
chasing strategy. I propose a two stage model in which in the …rst stage each
…rm decides whether it will join a coalition to purchase information and there-
fore share the cost of information acquisition, to individually purchase infor-
mation, or to remain uninformed. In the second-stage …rms engage in Cournot
competition to choose output. The model I propose encompasses the main as-
sumptions of the current view on information acquisition, mainly thoserelated
to the role of information and how it a¤ects …rms’ pro…ts. However, I will
argue that by adding natural assumptions on oligopolists’ behavior, I can o¤er
a model that provides a better description of …rms’ actions and trade-o¤s than
the standard view.
Keywords:Information Acquisition, Cournot Markets, Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium, Strong Nash Equilibrium.
11 Introduction
This paper studies Cournot markets with stochastic demand where …rms have the
possibility of perfectly knowledge the true realization of the demand parameter at a
…xed and exogenously given cost c > 0: In this context, …rms have to decide whether
or not to acquire this costly information before engaging in a Cournot competition
to choose output.
The extensive literature1 on information acquisition in Cournot markets with sto-
chastic demand has mainly been concerned with understanding and modelling the
protocol followed by …rms in deciding whether or not to purchase information. In
what follows, information acquisition has almost exclusively been modelled as a two-
stage game where in the …rst stage …rms decide whether or not to purchase informa-
tion (and eventually the degree of precision of the information to be acquired) and in
the second stage choose output.
Inthis paperIchallenge this viewoninformationacquisitionclaiming that thecur-
rent literature has failed to identify an important step in the …rms’ decision process.
More speci…cally, I will claim that the set ofactions available to …rms in the …rst stage
of the game is larger than what has been assumed. Consequently, I shall argue that
the current two-stage approach to information acquisition is incomplete and does not
fully describe the …rms’ behavior.
The main objective of this paper is to provide what is, in my opinion, a more
plausible way to model information acquisition in Cournot markets with stochastic
demand. I will propose an alternative or “enhanced” two stage model of information
acquisition where in the …rst stage …rms decide whether or not to purchase informa-
tion and their information purchasing strategy. That is, each …rm not only chooses
whether to acquire information but also whether it will individually purchase infor-
1
See, for instance, Chang and Lee, 1992; Gal-Or, 1985-1986; Hwang, 1993; Li, 1995; Li et al., 1987;
Noveshek et al., 1982; Ponssard, 1979; ; Raith, 1996; Vives, 1988.
2mation or join a coalition2 to purchase information and therefore share the cost of
information acquisition.
The model I propose encompasses the main assumptions of the “standard” or cur-
rent view on information acquisition, mainly those related to the role of information
and howit a¤ects …rms’ pro…ts. However, I will argue that by adding natural assump-
tions on oligopolists’ behavior, I can o¤er a model that provides a better description
of …rms’ actions and trade-o¤s than the standard view.
As we shall see, the change in …rms’ set of actions in the …rst stage of the game
leads to a considerably di¤erent outcome compared to the standard two-stage ap-
proach. More importantly, the results obtained in regarding …rms’ incentive for cost
sharing are not trivial.
The decision to join a coalition to share the cost of information acquisition a¤ects
…rms’ individual cost of information and consequently the incentives for acquiring
information. Although common-sense would suggest that sharing the cost of infor-
mation acquisition is the optimal strategy for all …rms purchasing information, I will
show that this is not always the case. The crucial result I obtain is that “not sharing”
the cost of information may be the optimal strategy for a …rm (or set of …rms) if it
prevents competitors from becoming informed, as long as the informational asymme-
try results in higher pro…ts to the informed …rm(s) even if they are to pay the full
cost of information acquisition.
The results in this paper build upon …rms’ incentive for purchasing information
and how information asymmetry andprivate informationa¤ects informed …rms’ prof-
its. Below I brie‡y discuss these points.
2
Throughout the paper the term coalition will be used in a neutral sense without structural or
institutional implication to denote the subset of all …rms in the market. The term coalition refers
to a cost-reduction alliance with the sole objective to share the cost of information acquisition.
31.1 Incentives for information acquisition
It is well-recognized that when demand is stochastic and …rms simultaneously choose
quantities, informed …rms have no incentive for information sharing because they may
bene…t from the informational asymmetry in the market (See, for instance, Gal-Or
1985-1986; Raith, 1996; or Vives, 1994.) Here, the incentive for information acquisi-
tion is twofold: to be informed and, preferably, better informed than the competitors.
The literature on information acquisition in Cournot competition has extensively
shown that, depending on the cost of information acquisition, just “to be informed”
is not enough of incentive for a …rm to deviate from being uninformed and purchase
information. A …rm may need “to be better informed” than some competitors in order
for information acquisition to be optimal.
Generally, …rms acquire information when there is a bene…cial trade o¤ between
the cost of information acquisition and its bene…ts (i.e., the increment in …rms’ rev-
enue caused by the acquisition of information), that is, when …rm’s pro…t net of
the cost of information acquisition is higher than what it would be if the …rm had
remained uninformed.
A way to assess these bene…ts is to consider that information facilitates better
decision making so that there is a direct gain3 which emerges from information re-
gardless of competitors’ informedness. Hence, if the cost of information acquisition
is a¤ordable to a …rm, it would seem that …rms always prefer to be informed than
uninformed. However, in an oligopoly, the analysis of the role of information and its
e¤ects on …rms’ pro…ts would be incomplete if the e¤ect of private information on
the behavior of competitors were not taken into account.
To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario: You and I producing a
homogeneous good in a duopolistic market with stochastic demand. The demand
3
I borrowed this de…nition from Hauks and Hurkens (2001).
4can be high or low with equal probability and we both have that knowledge. Upon
observing the cost of information acquisition I decide to purchase information and
you do not. I learn that the demand is high. You remain uninformed. You choose
quantity conditional on the expected demand and consequently produce less than
what you would if knew the true realization of the demand parameter. When I
choose quantity, I take into account the true realization of the demand parameter
and the fact that I am the only one with this information. As result, I respond more
“aggressively” to the information I received (i.e., I produce more) than I would in the
absence of private information. Consequently, I will increment my pro…ts because I
will produce enough quantity to match also the part of demand you will not be able
to supply. Thus, I will increase my pro…t not only because I am informed but also
because I am better informed than you are.4
What I just described, is the indirect gain from information, which emerges from
the strategic interaction between an informed and an uninformed agent. If we were
both informed, the two of us would have an increase in pro…ts (direct gain) compared
to the situation in which we are both uninformed. However, neither would have the
extra gain (indirect gain) from being better informed than the competitor. Following
Hauk and Hurkens (forthcoming), throughout the paper I will refer to the direct gain
asthe informational value of information andtotheindirect gainasthestrategic value
of information. It is important to stress that the existence of the strategic value of
informationexplains …rms’ lack of incentive for sharing (exogenously or endogenously
given) information in Cournot markets with stochastic demand as aforementioned in
this introduction.
4
Likewise, if I learn that the demand is low I will choose my quantity output taking into account
that you will overproduce. Obviously, when …rms decide whether or not to purchase information
they do not know if the signal to be received will be of “high” demand or “low” demand. The
eventual losses that …rms have when the demand is low and the uninformed …rms overproduce is
outweigh by the gains informed …rms have when the demand is high. Gal-Or (1985, footnote 3)
shows an interesting numerical example.
5The two-stage approach to information acquisition allows the strategic value of
informationto be included inthe trade-o¤ betweenthe cost andbene…tof information
because decisions taken in the …rst-stage become common knowledge before …rms
choose output.5
Another important feature of the two-stage approach to information acquisition
is that it relies on the so-called truth-telling assumption. As the name suggests,
it is assumed that …rms’ informedness becomes common knowledge because, at the
beginning of the second-stage, …rms truthfully reveal their information acquisition
decisions to the competitors.6
The model presented in this paper is also based on the truthtelling assumption
and recognizes the strategic component of information. However, I show that the
implications of this assumption go beyond those predicted by the standard two-stage
approach to information acquisition.
In the enhanced model I propose, in the …rst stageupon observingthe exogenously
given cost of information acquisition c each …rm i has to decide its information pur-
chasing strategy. A …rm would be willing to purchase information and share the cost
of information acquisition if either, (i) cost sharing does not increase the number
of informed …rms compared to an equilibrium in which …rms individually purchase
information, and thus does not decrease the strategic value of information or; (ii)
5
This structure is crucial. If …rms do not know the competitors’ informedness, the e¤ect of private
information (strategic value) cannot be considered.
6
Even though there is some skepticism with respect to the plausibility of the truth-telling as-
sumption, it is largely accepted in the literature on information acquisition. Meanwhile e¤orts have
been made to strengthen this assumption (See, for instance, Milgrom (1981), Milgron and Roberts
(1986)). If the truth-telling assumption is rejected so is the possibility to include the strategic value
of information in the trade o¤ between the cost of information and its bene…ts. If a …rm believes
that competitors are lying with respect to their informedness, …rms will not take into account the
informedness of the competitors when choosing output. In turn, this also a¤ects the way information
acquisition is modelled. If …rms take into account only the direct gain of information, information
acquisition ought to be modelled as an one-stage rather a two-stage game (see Hauk and Hurkens,
2001.)
6the cost sharing scheme attracts otherwise uninformed …rms but there is a favorable
trade o¤ between the endogenous cost of information acquisition and the strategic
value of information, that decreases as the number of informed …rms increases.
On the other hand, a …rm would remain uninformed if there is negative trade-
o¤ between the cost of information acquisition and its bene…ts, regardless of the
information purchasing strategy chosen.
It is important to stress that the coalition to share the cost of information acqui-
sition (if formed), is dissolved in the beginning of the second-stage and …rms choose
output competitively.7
We shall see that, although the outcome of the enhanced two stage game substan-
tially di¤ers from the standard two stage game, it is consistent with the standard
assumption that in Cournot markets with stochastic demand …rms have no incen-
tive for information sharing8. In addition, the model’s prediction is also consistent
with the common wisdom that oligopolists’ incentive for cooperative e¤ort to obtain
higher pro…ts is very strong. However, the enhanced two stage approach reveals that
the standard two-stage modelling of information acquisition does not account for an
important step in …rms’ information acquisition process in which …rms reconcile the
lack of incentive for information sharing with the incentive for sharing the cost of
information acquisition.
Firms that hold information are aware that information sharing per se does not
generate bene…ts to them. In turn, it is not plausible to assume that any game of
information acquisition leading to a Cournot competition would start with any sort
7
It is well recognized that cost-reduction arrangements as I am proposing here often facilitates the
formation of coalition in market, when …rms choose quantities. However, here I am discussing …rms
incentive to form cost-sharing alliances to share the cost of information acquisition assuming that
they will behave competitively when choosing quantities.
8
See, for instance, Clarke (1983), Fried (1987), Ponsard (1979), Raith (1996).
7of cooperative e¤ort by …rms. Cooperation would develop when …rms realize that,
given the strategic value it would obtain, …rm could increase pro…ts by sharing the
cost of information acquisition9.
The fact that economists neglected to recognize that information acquisition de-
cisions include the possibility of sharing the cost of information may bring adverse
consequences in terms of policy measures. The outcome of the standard two-stage
game points to a socially undesirable duplication of cost of information acquisition
(See, Hauks and Hukens, 2001). The alternative approach I propose, on the other
hand, shows that the duplication of costs (when it exists) is to a much lesser degree
because there are con…gurations of the parameter value such that it is optimal for
…rms to share the cost of information acquisition.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the set-up of the
model. The alternative two stage model of information acquisition is described in
section 3. Section 4 presents the solution to the model. Section 5 concludes and
discusses possible direction of further research. In the Appendix A I present a nu-
merical example which illustrates the striking di¤erences between the two approaches
to information acquisition.
9
Based upon this reasoning, in an earlier version of this paper I modeled information acquisition
as a three stage game where in the …rst stage …rms decide whether or not to individually purchase
information and then, in the second stage upon observing the competitors’ decisions, decide whether
it would be optimal to share the cost of information acquisition. However, in order for this approach
to make sense, I had to assume that decisions in the …rst-stage are not binding. It would result in
a “cheap talk” sort of equilibrium, as in the …rst stage any action would be optimal. The two-stage
approach I propose eliminates this inconvenience. However, this approach by no means implies an
assumption that in Cournot markets with stochastic demand informed …rms have the incentive for
information sharing.
82 The Setup
Consider aCournot oligopoly withn identical …rmsthat produce ahomogeneous good
for which the linear inverse demand function is given by P = D¡
n P
i=1
yi; where yi ¸ 0
is …rm i’s output choice. D = d, for d = H;L; is stochastic and withequal probability
can be high (D = H) or low (D = L) and it is assumed to be known to all …rms.
Production is costless. Nevertheless, …rms can learn the true realization of demand
parameter D at an exogenously given and …xed cost c > 0. Similar to the model
proposed by Ponsard (1979), here the demand parameter is either perfectly learned
or not learnedat all. The cost ofinformationacquisition is common knowledge among
…rms.
2.1 Baseline Model 1: The non-information game
The baseline model is the classical Cournot oligopoly model with stochastic demand
withoutthepossibility ofinformationacquisition. Thenon-informationgameissolved
as a static game in which …rms simultaneously and individually choose quantity out-
put, yiU, to maximize their expected pro…t E(¼i=D). De…ne ¼iU
¼iU = E(P)yiU (1)
where E is the expectation operator.












A yiU, j = 1;¢ ¢ ¢;n
9Solving this maximization problem we have (y¤
iU) i = 1;:::;n that satis…es the
following set of linear equations
n X
j=1
yjU + yiU = E(D);i = 1;¢ ¢ ¢;n;j = 1;¢ ¢ ¢;n




and then substituting to …nd each value of yiU. Therefore, there is a unique pure













2.2 Baseline Model 2: Information Acquisition Games (with-
out cost sharing)
Here, I allow …rms to individually acquire costly information. Let
¼iI = E(¼i=D = d)
be …rm i’s expected pro…t when the …rm knows the true realization of the demand
parameter D before the output decision is taken.
Regardless of the speci…cation of the game and considering that information is
costly, it is optimal for …rm i to acquire information if and only if
¼iI ¸ ¼iU
that is, if the expected pro…t after acquiring costly information is greater than or
10equal to the expected pro…t when information is not available10.
3 The Alternative Approach to Information Ac-
quisition
As discussed earlier, this paper models information acquisition as a two-stage game.
The game proceeds as follows:
First stage: Firms observe the exogenously givencost ofinformationacquisition
c > 0and sequentially11 decide whether topurchaseinformationandtheir information
purchasing strategy.
The actions available to each …rm i at this stage are:
(i) to share the cost of information. If a …rm takes this action, it will be willing
to purchase information and share the cost with any other …rm which wants to do
the same.
(ii) not to share the cost of information. If a …rm chooses this action it will
individually purchase information, that is, it will not participate in any cost sharing
scheme.
(iii) do not purchase information (UN). If this action is chosen, the …rm will not
purchase information and remain uninformed.
Hence, actions at this stage are a1i 2 fS;NS;UNg:
After …rms have decided their purchasing strategy, the uncertainty of the state of
demand is resolved for those that have decided to become informed.
The underlying assumption is that …rms have no veto power meaning that, once
10Here I assume that when …rms are indi¤erent between acquiring information or to remain
uninformed they will always prefer to become informed.
11
It will be assumed that in the …rst stage …rms move sequentially. The reason for this is to avoid
multiple equilibria in the …nal solution of the game (See remark 2).
11a …rm proposes to share information (action S) no other …rm can be banned from
joining such an “information sharing” scheme (see remark 1 below.)
Decisions taken in this stage are binding. De…ne I as the set of informed …rms
at the end of the second-stage and let 0 · K · n be the number of …rms in this
set. The set I is partitioned into two subsets. The subset S consists of …rms sharing
the cost of information acquisition such that S = fi j a1i = Sg and the subset N
of …rms individually purchasing information such that N = fi j a1i = NSg. De…ne
0 · K¤ · K as the number of …rms in S and (K ¡ K¤) as the number of …rms in
N: Notice that S [ N = I and S \ N = ;: For a …rm i 2 S its expected pro…t is
denoted by ¼iS, that is, …rm’s pro…t is a function of the number of …rms sharing the
cost of information. For a …rm i 2 N, its expected pro…t is denoted by ¼iN. In this
case …rms are individually purchasing information and hence will pay the exogenously
given cost of information acquisition c.
Finally, de…ne U as the set of …rms that remain uninformed at the end of the
second stage such that U = fi j a1i = UNg. Then (n ¡ K) is the number of …rms in
this set. For …rm i 2 U the expected pro…t is given by equation (??):
Second stage The numbers K and K¤ of …rms become common knowledge and
…rms simultaneous and individually choose output. Let yiI and yiU, be the quantity
of output chosen by the informed and uninformed …rms, respectively. Actions at this
stage are in the set
a2;i2I 2 fyiI : yiI 2 R+g
a2;i2U 2 fyiU : yiU 2 R+g:
Notice that the output choice of informed …rms is the same regardless of the
purchasing strategy chosen12.
Remark 1 (Cost sharing scheme) Although a general transaction cost paid by
…rms for cooperative e¤orts to share the cost of information is intuitively appealing,
I do not model such a charge. I instead assume that there is a trade association
12This is because the marginal cost of information acquisition is zero.
12(TA, hereafter) that shares the information it receives from members with all …rms
in the industry (members or non members). That is, in my extensive form, it is
as if at the end of the …rst-stage, …rms (members and non-members) reveal their
information purchasing strategy to the trade association (TA) that will be responsible
for purchasing the information on behalf of each coalition. Once a …rm reports its
decision, it is bound by it. I will assume that if a …rm decides to purchase information
(individually or collusively) it will be in its best interest to communicate its decision
to the other …rms through the TA. Thus, if a …rm does not communicate its decision
to the TA, it will be assumed that this …rm decided not to purchase information and
remained uninformed. Notice, though, that the information that the TA releases to all
…rms in the industry is the …rms’ informedness and information purchasing strategy
(that is, which …rm is or is not informed how it will purchase information.. The TA
does not reveal industry-wise the signal (high or low demand) informed …rms received.
Remark 2 (Sequential protocol) I will mainly be interested in the total number
of …rms that, in equilibrium, acquire information (recall that …rms are identical).
Suppose, for instance, that there were n = 3 …rms and, in equilibrium, only two …rms
become informed. If we had assumed that …rms move simultaneously, three possible
equilibria with two informed …rms would arise. If …rms move sequentially, for any
sequential protocol, there will be a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which only
the …rst and second …rms to move become informed. Thus, I rely on the sequential
protocol to avoid this type of multiple equilibria. The nature and quality of my results
would remain unchanged in a model without sequential protocol.
4 The Solution to The Enhanced Two Stage Game
The equilibrium notion used to solve the game is the one of Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium (SPNE) and Strong Nash Equilibrium (SNE). The game is solved by
backwards induction starting with the continuation game, the output choice game.
Following the baseline model described in Section 2.1, if a …rm i remains unin-
formed its equilibrium output y¤
iU, is given by equation (??) and each uninformed
…rm’s expected pro…t, ¼¤
iU; is given by equation (??).
However, if a …rm decides to become informed by the time it chooses output it
perfectly knows the realization of the demand parameter. The uncertainty is resolved
and …rms engage in a Cournot competition to determine output. Thus, to solve the
13continuation game, we have to…ndthe pure strategy Nash equilibrium to the Cournot
subgame. At this stage informed …rms play a game of complete information (with
respect to the opponents’ pro…t function and informedness, and the demand function)
but imperfect information (…rms choose output simultaneously). The equilibrium
output determined in the continuation game will be function of the total number of
informed …rms K; and the realization of the demand parameter D.
Once we …nd the equilibrium output choice in the continuation game, we substi-
tute these values into the expected pro…t function of each of the K informed …rms
in the set I: The expected pro…t of …rms in I depends on the cost of information
and, consequently, …rms’ information purchasing strategy. On these expected pro…ts
…rms base their equilibrium informationpurchasing strategy (share, not share, do not
purchase) in the …rst stage and the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium to the entire
game is determined.
We cannowproceedto formally solve the enhanced two stage game of information
acquisition.
4.1 Solving the continuation game when …rms take informed
decisions
I will now …nd the Nash equilibrium of the continuation game when …rms make
informed decisions.
The next lemma displays the equilibrium to the continuationgame, specifying the
equilibrium output to the informed …rms, y¤
iI: Recall that the equilibrium output to
the uninformed …rms, y¤
iU; is the same as in the …rst baseline model (refer to equation
??).





D ¡ (n ¡ K)y¤
iU
K +1
when i 2 I and K · n, for any K
¤ · K.
Proof. See Appendix.
When a …rm decides to become informed, its decision depends on the output
choice of the K informed and the (n ¡ K) uninformed competitors. The value of
K is common knowledge at the beginning of the continuation game (truth-telling
assumption):
On the other hand, uninformed …rms take into account only the expected value
of demand and the total number of competitors (see equation (??)). Uninformed
…rms, obviously, do not know the true realization of the demand parameter. Thus,
when choosing output uninformed …rms rely on the expected value of the demand
function to estimate competitors’ output choice. Thus, to the uninformed …rms, the
informedness of the competitors does not really matter.
4.2 Solving the …rst stage of the game
Solving the model backwards, in the …rst stage I calculate …rms’ incentive to become
informed and share the cost of information acquisition given the equilibrium quanti-
ties calculated inthe second stage. The intuitionis as follows. For each realization of
D, in the …rst stage …rms anticipate the optimal choice of output in the second-stage,
which depends on K, the total number of informed …rms. In the …rst stage each …rm
has to verify whether it is optimal to pay the full cost of information acquisition to
obtain information on D, to join a cost sharing scheme to purchase information, or
to remain uniformed. This decision will be based on the trade-o¤ between the cost
of information (shared or not) and its bene…ts.
A way to relate the bene…ts from information to the optimal output of informed
…rms is by observing that the true realization of D determines the informational
15value of information, while K, the total number of informed …rms will determine the
strategic value of information. If a …rm decides to purchase information, the decision
of whether or not to share the cost of information surely does not a¤ect D, however
it may a¤ect K; the total number of informed …rms.
Substituting y¤
iI into the expected pro…t function ¼iS and ¼iNwe obtain the in-
formed …rm’s expected pro…t.
In the …rst stage the cost of information for each …rm is endogenously determined
and depends onthe …rms’ decision on whethertoindividually purchase informationor
to join an information sharing scheme. Notice that the cost of information acquisition
is evenly shared among the participants of the scheme. Thus, if K¤ ¸ 2; that is, if at
least two …rms agree to participate in a cost sharing scheme, the cost of information





A …rm i 2 N that individually purchases information pays the full …xed cost of
information14, c > 0.
The expected pro…t is a function of the true realization of the demand parameter
D, the total number of informed …rms K and the cost of information acquisition
(shared or not shared).
If …rm i in the …rst stage decides to purchase information and share the cost of
13
If the set S is a singleton, that is, if K¤ = 1; the cost of information acquisition for this …rm,
will be equal to c: Nevertheless, even in this case, the information acquisition cost is said to be
endogenous because it was determined by the …rm’s decision of not sharing the cost of information.
14
It is interesting to notice that if only one …rm decides to share the cost of information acquisition,
although this …rm belongs to S; it will pay the full cost of information acquisition c > 0: In other
words, a …rm i would be indi¤erent between sharing or not sharing the cost of information acquisition
if (n ¡ 1) …rms decide to not share the cost of information acquisition. Thus, …rms bene…t from a
cost sharing scheme if and only if K¤ ¸ 2. In what follows, this paper will be interested in joint
deviations instead of single deviations from “not share the cost” to “share the cost” of information.
16information acquisition its expected pro…t function will be given by
¼iS = E
"
D2 ¡ (n ¡ K)ED2 ¡ (n ¡ K)2(K + 1)




which depends on K, the total number of …rms in I; and K¤ the total number
of …rms in the set S that share the exogenous cost of information acquisition c. (See
Appendix for algebra).
Alternatively, if …rm i decides not to share the cost of information acquisition and
individually purchase information its expected pro…t is given by
¼iN = E
"
D2 ¡ (n ¡ K)ED2 ¡ (n ¡ K)2(K +1)
(K +1)2 ¡ c
#
(5)
and depends on the total number of …rms actually purchasing information and
the exogenously given cost of information acquisition, c.
Thus, in the …rst stage of the game …rms’ decisions are as follows:








that is, if a …rm’s pro…t when it purchases information and shares the cost of
information, ¼¤
iS; is higher compared to pro…ts when the …rm either individually
purchases information, ¼¤
iN; or remains uninformed, ¼¤
iU.









Just recall that the number of informed …rms changes depending on …rms’ purchasing strategy.
16
To ease the notation, from now on and whenever it is clear, I will omit the argument of the pro…t
functions.
17that is, if individually purchasing information gives higher pro…t to …rm i com-
pared to purchasing information and sharing the cost of information acquisition, ¼¤
iS;
or remaining uninformed, ¼¤
iU.






where the expected pro…t of the uninformed …rms is given by equation (??) of the
baseline model in section 2:1. In words, a …rm i does not purchase information if it
has higher pro…ts when uninformed, regardless of the purchasing strategy.
In the …rst stage …rms’ decisions ultimately determine the values of K and K¤,
that is the total number of informed …rms and the number of …rms sharing the cost of
information acquisition. Thus, before proceeding to the formal analysis to determine
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, it is important to discuss how …rms’ pro…ts
are a¤ected by these two variables.
Keeping everything else constant, the expected pro…t for each informed …rm i 2 S



























> 0 for all K
¤ · K




@K¤ < 0 for all K¤ · K · n:
This result is straightforward as an increase in K¤ leads to a decrease in the
information acquisition cost ci(K¤) =
c
K¤.
On the other hand, the expectedpro…t of each …rm i 2 I = S [N decreases as K;
the number of …rms taken informed decisions, increases. That is, as the informational
asymmetry in the market decreases, the strategic value of informed …rms (the gain










< 0 for all K · n:
The alternative two stage game poses an interesting problem to …rms, that is, to
reconcile the incentive to share the cost of information acquisition and the lack of
incentive for information sharing.
Following the discussion above and proceeding to …nd the equilibrium to the
information acquisition game, let us now calculate …rms’ bene…t from being informed
as opposed to being uninformed. This can be done by calculating the di¤erence





c if i 2 N
c(K¤) =
c




expected pro…t if informed
¡ E[¼i=D]
| {z }




2 ¡ Ci for any 1 · K · n:
(9)
(see Appendix for algebra).
If we denote VarD
(K+1)
2 = TV(K) the total value of information we can rewrite equa-
tion (??) as
E[¼i=D = d]¡ E[¼i=D] = TV (K) ¡ Ci:
Hence, …rms become informed if and only if,
TV(K) ¸ Ci (10)
17
This result is based on the second baseline model and holds regardless of the speci…cation of …rms’
actions in the …rst stage of the game.
19Let us now observe how the total value of information TV (K) changes as the





(K + 1)3V arD < 0 for any 1 · K · n: (11)
As discussed earlier, equation (??) shows that TV is a decreasing function of the
total number of informed …rms, K.
For …rms that share the cost of information, the marginal cost of information




(K¤)2 < 0 for any 2 · K¤ · K: (12)
It is easy to verify that for any …xed value of c and K, the negative value of
expression (??) is maximized when K = K¤: Not surprisingly, then, for any given
K, the information acquisition cost is minimized when all …rms are included in the
coalition. Based on this result I state the next Lemma.
Lemma 2 In the equilibrium of the enhanced two-stage game of information acqui-
sition in which K is the number of informed …rms and c(K¤) is the information
acquisition cost function, when a coalition is formed K¤ = K, that is all informed
…rms share the cost of information acquisition and consequently only one coalition is
formed.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2 rules out the possibility of more than one coalition to be formed in
equilibrium. Thus, either all …rms purchasing information share the cost amongst
themselves; or …rms that purchase informationdo so individually. Notice that lemma
2 does not say anything about the total number of …rms that become informed or how
the decision to share or not to share information is taken. This will be determined
by the next lemmas and proposition.
20Following Lemma 2 we can substitute K¤ = K into equation (??) and compare
the rate of changes in the total value of information (TV ) and in the marginal cost
for any given value of K (equations ?? and ??, respectively):
For any value of K and c, a decrease in the marginal cost due to a cost-sharing
scheme will be o¤set by a reduction in the strategic value, and consequently is not

























We can now proceed to …nd the subgame Nash equilibrium of the game; we
now know that when a coalition is formed it encompasses all …rms that purchase
information (Lemma 2), that is, K¤ = K. This implies that, in equilibrium either
S = ; or N = ;; that is, the set of informed …rms I may have either only …rms
sharing information (I = S) or …rms individually purchasing information (I = N).
Let #S denote the cardinality of the set S. If I = S we have that #S = KS. That
is, K = KS is the total number of informed …rms when in equilibrium, a coalition is
formed. Similarly, if I = N we have that #N = KN, where K = KN is the number
of informed …rms that in equilibrium individually purchase information.
Bear in mind, however, that for the same initial cost c; the total number of in-
formed …rms (KS or KN) may di¤er depending on whether, in equilibrium, a coalition
is formed or not.
In order to determine the equilibrium of the game we must relate the cost of
informationacquisition(Ci) withthe total value ofinformation(TV). Inwhat follows




(n +1)2 = TV (n):
be the total value of information when the total number of informed …rms is




be the total value of information acquisition when there is only one informed …rm,
that is, K = 1. Recall that total value of information represents the increment in
…rms’ revenue caused by the acquisition of information and does not directly depend
on the information purchasing strategy used by …rms but on the total number of
informed …rms. Nevertheless, …rms’ pro…ts depend on the information purchasing
strategy.
4.2.1 Cooperative re…nements ofNash equilibrium and the subgame Nash
equilibrium
Continuing to solve the game backwards, in order to …nd the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium for the whole game, we have to …nd the equilibrium of the reduced game
where …rms decide whether to become informed and the purchasing strategy after
identifying (pure strategy) Nash equilibria in the output choice subgame. If we use
the concept of Nashequilibrium to solve the …rst stage, multiple equilibriamight arise
for di¤erent values of c and some of them would clearly be ine¢cient (see remark 3
below). We need, therefore, to obtain a sharper prediction about …rms incentive to
form a coalition to share the cost of information acquisition. To this end, I will use
an equilibrium concept which allows deviations by a group of …rms not just individual
deviations. Theconcept I will use tosolve the …rst stageof the game and todetermine
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to the whole game is the one of strong Nash
Equilibrium (SNE)18. This equilibrium concept is appropriate to analyze the model
18
22in this paper as a coalition is formed if and only if at least two …rms deviate from
purchasing alone and decide to share the cost of information acquisition.
The next Lemma introduces the strong Nash equilibrium to the …rst stage of the
two stage information acquisition game.
Lemma 3 In the unique (strong) Nash Equilibrium of the two-stage game of infor-
mation acquisition, in which …rms decide whether to purchase information and the
purchasing strategy
1. If c · c, U = ;; I = S ) #S = n,
2. If c > c, I = ;; U 6= ; ) #N = n;
3. If c < c · c, U 6= ;, I 6= ; such that.
(a) If VarD ·
c(K+1)3
2K3 ;I = S 6= ; ) #S = KN;
U 6= ; ) #U = n ¡ KS:
(b) If VarD >
c(K+1)3
2K3 ;I = N 6= ; ) #N = KN;
U 6= ; ) #U = n ¡ KN:
Proof.
1. The exogenous cost of information acquisition is
c · c =
VarD
(n + 1)2 = TV(n):
In this case, the exogenous cost of information acquisition c is less than or
equal to the increment in …rms’ revenue (total value of information) when n
The concept of Strong Nash Equilibrium was introduced by Aumann (1959). Brie‡y, a strategy
pro…le is a strong Nash equilibrium if and only if it is Pareto-e¢cient and immune to any coalitional
or joint deviation. For a de…nition of SNE see also Myerson (1991).
23…rms purchase information, TV (n): Thus, individually purchasing information








(n +1)2 ¡ c
= TV (n) ¡ c ¸ 0
Now we have to check whether the strategy “to individually purchase informa-
tion” (NS) is dominated by the strategy “to share the cost of information”
(S)19.
This case is trivial, as an equilibrium in which n …rms would individually pur-
chase information is vulnerable to the joint deviation in which K¤ · n …rms
share the cost of information acquisition. The total number of informed …rms
would not change and consequently the total value of information would not






Thus, ifc < c, each …rm i 2 I shares thecost ofinformationacquisitionbecause,
¼¤
iS(KS = n) ¡ ¼¤
iN(KN = n) > 0







That is, the strategy “to share the cost of information” strictly dominates the
19
It is important to recall that, according to Lemma 2, when …rms purchase information there are
only two possible equilibria, that is, an equilibrium in which …rms individually purchase information
or an equilibrium in which …rms form a coalition. The possibility of an equilibrium in which the num-
ber of …rms sharing information is di¤erent from the total number of …rms purchasing information
is ruled out by Lemma 2.
24strategies “to individually purchase information” and “to remain uninformed”.
If c < c, …rm i shares the cost of information acquisition because
¼
¤






U = ;; I = S ) #S = n:
2. The cost of information acquisition is
c > c =
V arD
22 = TV(1):
If c = c it is optimal for a …rm to purchase information if and only if it is the only
informed …rm. If c > c, however, no uninformed …rm in this equilibrium deviates and
individually purchase information because for any20
Remark 3 (multiple Nash equilibria) In order to stress the bene…t of using the
concept of strong Nash equilibrium, it is interesting to observe ine¢ciencies that arise
20
Recall that for Lemma 2, if a coalition is formed K ¤ = K: Recall also that K, the total number
of informed …rms di¤er depending on …rms purchasing strategy. That is, K = KN or KS depending
on whether, in equilibrium …rms decide to individually purchase information or to join a coalition.
As a shortcut, I will always use KN or KS to indicate the total number of informed …rms instead




iN (KN) ¡ ¼
¤
iU = TV(KN ) ¡ c < 0:
Thus, if c > c, the strategy “to remain uninformed” strictly dominates the strategy “toindividually
purchase information” for any KN ¸ 1.
Now we have to check whether if it is optimal for at least KS ¸ 2 …rms to deviate and purchase














25if instead we look for the Nash equilibrium of the reduced game (…rst-stage). In
lemma 3 (1), for instance, for c · c there would be two Nash equilibria: Notice
that, keeping everything else constant, if (n ¡ 1) …rms decide not to share the cost
Rearranging the above inequality we have
KS




Recall, however, that c > c = V arD




+ " for " 2 (0;1): (16)
Substituting the value of c into the inequality (??) we have
KS
(KS + 1)2 ¸
V arD + 4"
4V arD
:
Solving the above expression for " we have that the inequality (??) holds, if and only if
" · V arD
µ
KS
(KS + 1)2 ¡ 0:25
¶
:
However, a coalition is formed if and only if at least 2 …rms (KS ¸ 2) deviate from being unin-
formed and purchase information sharing the cost.
Notice that for KS ¸ 2;
KS
(KS + 1)2 · 0:22 ) ¡1 < " < ¡0:03V arD:
That is, inequality (??) holds only for strictly negative values of ": However, strictly negative
values of " imply c · c (refer to equation ??). That is, it is optimal for KS ¸ 2 to become informed





iS(KS) for any KS ¸ 2:
In other words, “to remain uninformed” strictly dominates the strategy “to purchase information”
regardless of the purchasing strategy used by …rms.
Thus, in equilibrium, c > c implies that I = ;; U 6= ; ) #U = n:
3. The cost of information acquisition is c < c · c.
If c < c · c, there is a number 1 · KN < n of …rms individually purchasing information such
that,
¼¤
iN(KN ) ¡ ¼¤
iU =
VarD
(KN + 1)2 ¡ c ¸ 0:
Thus, for 1 · KN < n the strategy “to individually purchase information” dominates the strategy
“to remain uniformed”.
Now we have to check it is optimal for a …rm to deviate and purchase information sharing the
cost.





¤ = KS) ¸ ¼
¤
iN (K = KN )
26of information acquisition, …rm i would be indi¤erent between sharing or not sharing
that is if,
¼¤
iS(K¤ = KS) ¡ ¼¤
iN (K = KN ) ¸ 0
V arD











(KS + 1)2 ¡
V arD














as the change in the total value of information when …rms
change their purchasing strategy from individually purchasing information to sharing the cost of
information acquisition.





as the change in the individual cost of information acquisition
when …rms change their information purchasing strategy from individually purchasing information
to sharing the cost of information acquisition.
Thus, we can rewrite inequality (??) as
¢TV ¸ ¡¢C








Notice that for any KS ¸ 2, c¡ c
KS > 0 ) ¢C < 0:
(a) According to equations (??, ?? and, ??), if V arD ·
c(K+1)3
2K3 the reduction in the cost of
information acquisition o¤sets the eventual reduction in the strategic value of information.
That is, ¢T V
¢C ¸ ¡1 and it is easy to verify that this inequality holds for KS ¸ KN: Thus, in
this case it is optimal for …rms to share the cost of information acquisition and in equilibrium
I = S 6= ; ) #S = KS; U 6= ; ) #U = n ¡ KS :
(b) If, VarD >
c(K+1)3
2K3 , the reduction in the cost of information acquisition is o¤set by the
losses in strategic value, that is, ¢T V
¢C < ¡1: It is easy to verify that this inequality holds for
KS > KN . Thus if, it is optimal for …rms not to share the cost of information acquisition and
in equilibrium, I = N 6= ; ) #N = KN;
U 6= ; ) #U = n ¡ KN :
Notice that there is no equilibrium in which …rms share cost and KS < KN : This is trivial, if
there exists an equilibrium in which KN individually purchase information, that is, if
¼
¤
iN (KN ) ¸ ¼
¤
iU ;





27the cost of information acquisition. In this case, …rms’ pro…t when sharing or not
sharing would be the same. On the other hand , if at least one …rm has decided
to share the cost of information acquisition, …rm i0s best response is to share the
cost of information acquisition. Thus, if c · c, there would be two Nash equilibria:
one equilibrium in which all …rms share the cost of information and a second one
in which no …rms shares the cost of information acquisition. Although, both pro…le
would be Nash equilibria, only the strategy pro…le in which all …rms share information
is a strong Nash equilibrium (see footnote 13 for a de…nition of Nash equilibrium).
In other word, only the equilibrium pro…le in which all …rms share information is
not vulnerable to joint deviation, that is, more than one …rms deviating from this
equilibrium. Why is the equilibrium pro…le in which no …rms share the cost, is not
a SNE? Because while one …rm alone would have no incentive to deviate and share
the cost of information since it would not a¤ect its information acquisition cost, a
“group” of at least two …rms would have the incentive to deviate because doing so
would a¤ect their individual cost of information acquisition. Hence, “no …rm shares
the cost” is not “stable” and consequently cannot be a strong Nash equilibrium.
The next proposition states the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the infor-
mation acquisition game in which strong Nash equilibrium for the …rst-stage has been
found
Proposition 4 The n-tuples
(a) (#S = n; y¤
iS for i 2 S) if c · c;
(b) (#N = n; y¤
iN for i 2 N) if c > c;
(c) (#S = KS;#U = n ¡ KS; y¤
iS for i 2 S, y¤




(d) (#N = KN;#U = n ¡ KN; y¤
iN for i 2 N, y¤




constitute a subgame perfect Nash Equilibriumof the information acquisition game.
Remark 4 (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium) A pro…le of strategy is a sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium if it induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
Here, in the …rst subgame, which solves the whole game, I opted for using a re…ne-
ment of the Nash equilibrium to eliminiate ine¢cient equilibria. However, the fact
that I used this re…nement of Nash equilibrium does not a¤ect the essence of or is
inconsistent with the formal de…nition of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
28According to proposition 4, if the cost of information acquisition is su¢cient low
(c · c), all …rms inthe market purchase informationandshare thecost of information
acquisition. In this case, the total number of informed …rms in the enhanced model is
the same as in the standard two stage model to information acquisition. However, in
theformer, the total cost ofinformationacquisitionis considerable smaller. If the cost
of information acquisition is su¢ciently large (c > c) all …rms remain uninformed.
This outcome is also similar to the outcome of the standard two stage approach to
information acquisition. The intuition for this result is as follows. If the exogenous
cost of information acquisition (c) is too high, there would be necessary a coalition
with a large number of …rms in order to make the cost of information acquisition
a¤ordable. However, in this case, the strategic gain for each informed …rm would be
very low. Thus, the eventual strategic and informational gain informed …rms would
have would not be enough to compensate the shared cost of information acquisition.
For intermediate levels of information acquisitioncosts (c < c · c), theoutcome of
the enhanced and the standard approach to information acquisition are substantially
di¤erent. Within this range, according tothe enhanced two stage approach more…rms
would become informed. That is, depending on the exogenous cost of information
acquisition, …rms may decide to form a coalition to share the cost of information. The
coalition allows …rms, that would otherwise be uninformed, to purchase information.
The decision on whether or not to form a coalition depends on how the cost sharing
a¤ects the strategic value and the individual cost of information acquisition.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper presented an alternative or enhanced approach to information acquisition
in Cournot markets with stochastic demand. It was shown that the current literature
has failed to observe that despite the lack of incentive to information sharing, …rms
may …nd bene…cial to share the cost of information acquisition even if it implies an
29increase in the total number of informed …rms. The decision on whether or not to
form a coalition in the …rst-stage of the game depends on the trade-o¤ between the
endogenously determined cost of information acquisition and the bene…ts from being
informed as opposed to uninformed when choosing output in the second stage.
In the enhanced approach to information acquisition, …rms acquire more infor-
mation, which is socially desirable and at a lower cost, compared to the standard
two stage-game. In addition, …rms’ pro…ts are generally higher compared to the
standard two-stage approach to information acquisition. When the individual cost
of information is exogenously given (standard approach), …rms trade-o¤ the cost of
information acquisition against its bene…ts (strategic and informational value). How-
ever, when the possibility of cost sharing is considered, …rms face a more complex
trade-o¤ namely, the trade-o¤ between the endogenously determined cost of informa-
tion acquisition and its e¤ect on the strategic value. Firms that, in the equilibrium
of the standard two-stage game, would remain uninformed may deviate and purchase
information if there is a trade o¤ between the endogenized cost of information and
its bene…ts (strategic and informational value). The new trade o¤ introduced by the
alternative approach, con…rms the lack of incentive for information sharing though
proves that …rms may bene…t from cost sharing if the reduction in cost is not o¤ set
by the eventual increase in the number of informed …rms.
It has already been shownthat when the strategic value of information is included
in the trade-o¤ between cost and bene…t of information, …rms acquire more informa-
tion than when only the informational value of information is included (and thus
information acquisition is modelled as a one-stage game). However, the two-stage ap-
proach reveals an unfortunate consequence namely, the duplication of costly research,
which is socially undesirable (see Hauk and Hurkens, 2001). What the enhanced two
stage approach of information acquisition presented in this paper shows, however, is
that although the duplication of costly research may occur, it is on a much smaller
scale than what has been believed so far. Moreover, industries are more informed
30and total cost of information acquisition proven to be lower.
In this paper it was considered that …rms can either perfectly learn the realization
of the demand parameter or not learn it at all. A natural extension to this model
is to assume that information can be learned at di¤erent degrees of precision and
…rms have to decide on the precision of the information they are willing to acquire.
This treatment has already been applied in the two-stage approach to information
acquisition but it would interesting to verify how (and if) an information sharing
scheme is formed under these assumptions.
Further, although not directly related to the topic of information acquisition, it
would be interesting to investigate how …rms that supply information would react to
collusive consumers, in this case, …rms that join a cost sharing scheme to purchase
information.
Last but not least, there is still room for research with the objective to strengthen
the truth-telling assumption. This assumption is the backbone of most of the in-
formation acquisition models and e¤orts have to be made in order to mitigate or
eliminate questions regarding the plausibility of these assumptions.
A Appendix
A.1 Standard vs Enhanced Approach to Information Acqui-
sition: An Example
The objective of this example is to show the striking di¤erence between the outcome
of the two approaches to information acquisition.
Consider a Cournot Oligopoly as previously described, with n = 3 …rms for which
the inverse demand function is given by:
P = d ¡ Q
31where d = 50 or 100 with equal probability and Q is the aggregate demand. Let
EP = a ¡ Q
where a = 50+100
2 = 75:
If a …rm remains uninformed its expected pro…t is ¼¤
iU = 351:56
If all KN = 3 …rms decide to individually purchase information, the expected
pro…t of each informed …rm is
¼¤
iN(KN = 3) = 390:625¡ c
Thus, KN = 3 …rms individually purchases information if
¼
¤




If c · 39:065 and all …rms are informed, the total value of information (TV) is
given by the informational value of information (IV) only. Though the KN = 3 …rms
bene…t from taking better informed decision, none of them have the extra strategic
gain which emerges when a …rm(s) is (are) better informed than its competitor(s).
Thus, in this case we have that the total value of information is
TV = IV = ¼
¤




Consider now the possibility of cost sharing among …rms. If c · 39:065 and
KN = 3, …rms share the cost of information acquisition because for any c > 0
¼¤
iS(KS = 3) > ¼¤
iN(KN = 3):
32Hence, if c · 39:065 all …rms purchase information and the individual cost of
information acquisition to each informed …rm is c
3 · 39:065
3 = 13:02:
If only KN = 2; …rms decide to individually purchase information and the ex-
pected pro…t of each informed …rm i is
¼
¤
iN(KN = 2) = 421:09¡ c
Thus, KN = 2 …rms would individually purchase information if and only if,
¼¤
iN(KN = 2) ¸ ¼¤
iU
39:065 < c · 69:53
In this case the two informed …rms bene…t from the information asymmetry in
the market. The strategic value of information (SV ) is given by
SV = ¼
¤
iN(KN = 2)¡ ¼
¤
iN(KN = 3) = 30:465
and the informational value (IV) of information
IV = [¼¤
iN(KN = 2) ¡ ¼¤
iU] ¡ SV = 39:065:
The total value of information (TV) is given by
TV = IV +SV
= ¼
¤




Note that the informational value of information does not change as the number
of informed …rms decreases from 3 to 2. On the other hand, the strategic value of
information increases when instead of three there are only two informed …rms.




iN(KN = 2) ¸ ¼
¤
iS(KS = 3)





39:065 < c · 45:70
we have that #N = 2; S = ; and #U = 1: That is, there will be only two
informed …rms and they will not share the cost of information acquisition.
On the other hand, if
45:70 < c < 69:70
we have that #S = 3; N = ; and U = ;, that is, three …rms will acquire information,
sharing the cost of information acquisition, because in this case
¼¤
iN(KN = 2) < ¼¤
iS(K¤
S = 3)
If only KN = 1 …rm acquires information, its expected pro…t is
¼
¤
iN(KN = 1) = 507:81¡ c:
Thus, KN = 1 …rm individually purchases information if and only if
¼
¤
iN(KN = 1) ¸ ¼
¤
iU
69:53 < c · 156:25:
34The strategic value (SV) of information of the informed …rm is
SV = ¼
¤
iN(KN = 1)¡ ¼
¤
iN(KN = 3) = 117:185
and the informational value (IV) of information
IV = [¼
¤
iN(KN = 1) ¡ ¼
¤
iU] ¡ SV = 39:065:
The total value of information (TV) is given by
TV = IV +SV
= ¼¤




69:53 < c · 156:25
only one …rm (KN = 1) …rm purchases information.
Let us now allow …rms to share the cost of information acquisition. If 69:53 <
c · 156:25 three …rms would purchase information sharing the cost of information
acquisition if and only if
¼
¤







69:53 < c · 117:95:
Likewise, two …rms would become informed sharing the cost of information acqui-
sition if and only if
¼¤






117:95 < c · 139:06
For the cost range
139:06 < c · 156:25
only one …rm acquires information and KN because at this cost range
¼¤
iS(KS ¸ 2) < ¼¤
iU:




iS(KS ¸ 1) < ¼¤
iU:
36c KN IV SV TV c(k)
c · 39:625 3 39:065 0 39:065 c(k) · 39:625
39:53 < c · 69:53 2 39:065 30:465 69:53 39:625 < c(k) · 69:625
69:53 < c · 156:25 1 39:065 117:185 156:25 69:625 < c(k) · 156:25
c > 156:25 0 0 0 0 c(k) = 0
Table 1: Standard Two-Stage Game of Information Acquisition
c KN KS IV SV TV c(K¤) = c
K¤
c · 39:625 3 39:065 0 39:065 c(K¤) · 13:208
39:625 < c · 45:70 2 39:065 30:465 69:53 39:625 < c(K¤) · 45:70
45:70 < c · 69:53 3 39:065 0 39:065 15:23 < c(K¤) · 23:10
69:53 < c · 117:95 3 39:065 0 39:065 23:17 < c(K¤) · 39:32
117:95 < c · 139:06 2 39:065 30:465 69:53 58:975 < c(K¤) · 69:53
139:06 < c · 156:25 1 39:065 117:185 156:25 139:06 < c(K¤) · 156:25
c > 156:25 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Two-Stage Game of Information Acquisition with Cost Sharing
The table 1 shows the outcome of the two stage game and table 2 the outcome of
the two stage game of information acquisition with cost sharing.
A.2 Proofs and Solutions
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The informed …rms maximize their pro…t conditional on D, thus














yjU + yiI(D) = D

















yjU + yiI(D) = D




A.2.2 Derivation of equations 4 and 5
E(¼iS=D = d) = ¼iS(K;K¤) = E[y¤
iIP(Q)]¡ c(K¤) (18)
where
P(Q) = D ¡ [K(y
¤
iI)+ (n ¡ K)y
¤
iU]:
Substituting P(Q) into equation (??) we obtain equation 1:4:
Similarly if we substitute the value of P(Q) into the equation
E(¼iN=D = d) = ¼iN(K;c) = E[y
¤
iIP(Q)] ¡ c
we obtain equation (3:5):
A.2.3 Derivation of equation 9
Following Ponssard (1979, p. 247)’s proof for the di¤erence between the expected
pro…t knowing the realization of the demand parameter D = d and the expected
pro…ts not knowing d, observe that E[®Y + ¯]2 ¡ [E[®Y +¯]]
2 = ®2VarY where




















is a decreasing linear function of 2 · K¤ · K: For any …xed c and K; c(K¤) ! 0
as K¤ ! K:
A.3 Solving the Examples of Appendix A.1
A.3.1 Expected pro…t when all …rms are uninformed:
If all …rms remain uninformed each …rm i chooses qi to maximizes the expected pro…t
¼iU = E[¼i(qi;q¡i)=D] = qiUPe(Q) (19)
= qiU[75 ¡ q1¡ q2 ¡ q3]









3U = 0 (20)













Substituting eq(??) into eq(??) we have that
¼
¤
U = 18:75(75¡ (3)18:75)
= 351:56:
Expected pro…t when all …rms are informed. If all …rms are informed each
…rm i chooses qii to maximize




[¼iI(qi;q¡i)=D = 50] +
1
2




[qi(50 ¡ q1¡ q2 ¡ q3) ¡ Ci]+
1
2
[qiI(100 ¡ q1 ¡q2 ¡ q3) ¡ Ci]:
Finding the …rst order condition we have
@E[¼i(qi;q¡i)=D = d]
@qii






3i = 0 (24)












= 12:5 if D = 50
= 25 if D = 100
40Substituting the values of q¤
1i into equation (??) we have that
¼
¤
iI = 390:625 ¡Ci:
The algebra for the expected pro…ts when there are 2 or 1 follows the same pro-
cedure and thus omitted.
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